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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROD C. SLATER, 
Petitioner & Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Dept. of Human Services, 
CINDY HAAG, Director, and 
CHRIS MEGALONKIS, H.E.A.T. 
Supervisor, et al. , 
Respondents & Appellees. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
OPENING STATEMENT 
In this Reply, Appellant will respond to specific issues raised 
by the Appellees in their answering Brief filed on or about February 
22, 1994. Appellant intends to, not only dispute, but dispose of 
the entire argument as presented in behalf of the Appellees who 
question the validity of the position taken by Appellant in his Appeal 
to this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLEES' "STATEMENT OF FACTS" 
DOES NOT COINCIDE WITH THE RECORD 
Under "Summary of Argument" found on page 4 of Appellees' Brief, 
it states: "The lower court correctly dismissed Appellant's action 
Case No. 930443-CA 
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-1-
fwith prejudice1 based upon Appellant's expressed intent to voluntarily 
dismiss the action and Appellant's representation that he did not in-
tend to refile the action in the future." 
"The lower court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Appel-
lant's action 'with prejudice' because Appellant would be precluded 
from refiling his action in the future in any event due to the statu-
tory time limit on district court reviews of agency actions." 
The foregoing is inaccurate and does not correctly reflect Appel-
lant's position regarding the issue in question. Beginning on line 25 
of page 4, the Court Transcript reads as follows: 
THE COURT: Are you telling me that at some 
future date you think you intend to bring this claim 
again? This exact claim, not someting that may happen 
in the future, but this claim? 
MR. SLATER: There is a possibility that the same 
kind of action could be filed later if the state and 
the case workers for the state were to take a similar 
action against me in the future. (See Transcript, p.5, 
lines 4 thru 7, emphasis added). 
The above response by Appellant to Judge Medley's question clearly 
shows an entirely different intent of Appellant, when compared with 
the wording found in Appellees' Brief under "Summary of Argument", 
which is a misrepresentation of Appellant's position on this key 
issue. (See Addendum to Appellant's opening Brief at Section I) 
POINT II 
THE "CASES" OFFERED BY APPELLEES ARE 
INCONSISTENT WITH THEIR ARGUMENT 
On page 5 of Appellees' Brief under Point I of their argument, 
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which is subtitled, "The Lower Court Correctly Dismissed Appellant's 
Action With Prejudice", two cases are then cited, supposedly in sup-
port of the above theory. Said cases are found in a footnote on 
page 5: Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834 (Utah App. 1989); and Inter-
mountain Physical Medicine Assocs. v. Micro-Dex Corp., 739 P.2d 1131 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
In reviewing Cobabe v. Crawford, the primary issue presented to 
this Court (Utah App. Sept., 1989), was whether attorney fees should 
be awarded to the Crawfords, (Defendants & Appellants), because the 
Plaintiffs had voluntarily agreed to a dismissal of their action with 
prejudice. Thus, the Defendants claimed to be the prevailing party 
on appeal and entitled to attorney fees as stated in a provision of 
a prior contract with Cobabe and Canfield (Plaintiffs & Respondents). 
In reaching its decision, this Court reasoned as follows: 
"Since defendants are entitled to reasonable 
attorney fees under the contract if 'successful1, 
we need only decide whether the trial court erred 
in determining that there was no prevailing party 
under its dismissal with prejudice. Although our 
research did not reveal any Utah cases on point, 
other jurisdictions have held that fa dismissal 
with prejudice gives the defendant the full re-
lief to which he (or she) is legally entitled and 
is tantamount to a judgment on the merits.'" But 
later adding, "(in the absence of a statutory or 
contractual provision, attorney fees are improper 
where dismissal is with prejudice)." (Cites and 
emphasis deleted). 
There are interesting aspects to study in Cobabe v. Crawford, 
but that case has little or no relevancy to the case at bar. More-
over, Appellant can see no logical reason why Cobabe should be ac-
cepted as a viable citation in support of the Appellees in the matter 
at hand. In Cobabe, a dismissal with prejudice was agreed to by both 
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parties. Conversely, in the present matter the lower Court's dismis-
sal with prejudice, adverse to Appellant, is the basic issue and rea-
son for this Appeal. Further, there has been no discussion concern-
ing attorney fees in the instant case nor any contractual agreement 
whatsoever on that subject. 
Finally, it states in the Cobabe decision that, "After two and 
one-half years of litigation, plaintiffs informed the court that they 
were financially unable to prosecute the action and filed a motion 
to dismiss." (See 780 P.2d at p. 835). Again, there is little or 
no relevancy that should be beneficial to the Appellees herein. By 
all indications there had been vigorous litigation for an extended 
period of time in Cobabe, whereas there has been almost none in the 
instant case. The differences are numerous while similarities are 
minimal. 
Moving to Intermountain Physical Medicine Assocs. v. Micro-Dex 
Corp., the second case cited by Appellees under Point I of their ar-
gument, is another action appealed to this Court (July, 1987). There 
are several excerpts from the text of this decision that Appellant 
would like to quote: 
"The issue of dismissing an action with preju-
dice was recently addressed by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Bonneville Tower v. Thompson Michie Assoc., 
728 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1986)." (Also cited by Ap-
pellant in his opening Brief). 
". . . Dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(b) 
is a harsh and permanent remedy when it precludes 
a presentation of a plaintiff's claims on their 
merits. Our rules of procedure are intended to 
encourage the adjudication of disputes on their 
merits." 
". . . While courts are given great latitude and 
discretion in the application of the law, they 
still must have sufficient grounds to apply the 
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'harsh and permanent remedy' of a dismissal with 
prejudice. No such grounds appear here." (See 
739 P.2d at p.1133 under point (2) and (3) of 
Judge Davidson's Opinion. Emphasis added). 
Once more, Appellant can see no sound reason why Appellees 
would want to submit the Intermountain matter as an asset to their 
argument. Appellant believes this Court's reasoning in the Inter-
mountain decision fully supports Appellant's position in this Appeal, 
and would be completely satisfied with the same result. 
Since Appellees submitted only 3 citations in their defense, 
Appellant will discuss their third case now, Murray First Thrift & 
Loan Co. v. Benson, 563 P.2d 185, which went to the Utah Supreme Court 
in April, 1977, referred to on page 1 of Appellees' Brief. Quoting 
Justice Maughan in that decision: 
"This case was some sixteen months in prepara-
tion. All parties appeared at the appointed time 
for trial. A jury was impaneled, and opening state-
ments were made. At this juncture a noon recess 
was called. During this recess plaintiff settled 
its claim against the Bensons—the Bensons agreed 
to transfer certain realty to plaintiff. As a re-
sult, plaintiff moved counts two and three of its 
third-party complaint, against Ruff, be dismissed 
without prejudice; . ." 
" . . . Counsel for Ruff objected, and moved the 
court to dismiss counts two and three with preju-
dice. He stated he had been some sixteen months 
in preparation, and his client was there ready to 
proceed. The court inquired of counsel for plain-
tiff, if he were ready to proceed, he said 'no', 
giving the reason quoted above. Thereupon the 
court took the action we have affirmed." 
As clearly indicated throughout the foregoing, there is abso-
lutely no similarity whatsoever between the Murray First Thrift case 
and this case. To repeat, the Murray matter "was some sixteen months 
in preparation. All parties appeared at the appointed time for trial. 
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A jury was impaneled, and opening statements were made." This was a 
major dispute between a financial institution and several defendants 
wherein trial proceedings had actually begun—not to mention a con-
siderable amount of money involved. 
Nothing, even remotely close to the Murray matter, ever took 
place in the instant case. It simply defies common sense to suggest 
that the trial Court, in dismissing with prejudice, counts two and 
three of Murray First Thrift's third-party complaint should have any 
bearing at all in relation to this Appeal. 
In his opening Brief, Appellant cited and quoted pertinent ex-
cerpts from a substantial number of cases dealing with dismissals, 
and particularly where dismissals with prejudice were reversed on 
appeal when questionable lower Court decisions were found to be an 
abuse of judicial discretion. 
If not the leading case on this subject matter, then surely a 
key citation referred to repeatedly, especially in this jurisdiction, 
is Westinghouse El. Sup. Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Con., Inc., 544 P.2d 876 
(Utah S.Ct.1975). Appellant also cited Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v. 
Robbins, 335 P.2d 624 (Utah S.Ct.1959), another important Utah case 
that Chief Justice Ellett quoted from when writing his Opinion in 
Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 1368 (Utah S.Ct.1977). And 
Bonneville Tower v. Thompson Michie Assoc, 728 P.2d 1017, decided in 
the Utah Supreme Court in 1986, preceded by Polk v. Ivers, 561 P.2d 
1075, decided in Utah's highest Court in 1977, are both among a chain 
of cases cited by Appellant in his opening Brief that fully supports 
his position in this Appeal. 
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Perhaps of even greater significance, or at least of equal authori-
ty in the matter at hand, would be Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State 
Univ., 813 P.2d 1216, not only because the decision closely followed 
precedents established in other Utah cases, but also because it is 
a very recent decision rendered in 1991 from this Court. 
Appellant firmly believes that, not only are all of his Utah 
cases entirely relevant and right on point in relation to the issue 
presently on appeal, but also the two dozen other cases from diverse 
jurisdictions, both State and Federal that were cited in his opening 
Brief, should be more than sufficient in support of Appellantfs stated 
position herein. 
However, in response to Appellees1 answering Brief, Appellant 
has taken the time to do some additional research and found several 
cases from other jurisdictions that are, not only right on the mark, 
but also very interesting studies in relation to this litigation. 
For example, in Schilling v. Walworth County Park & Planning Com'n, 
805 F.2d 272 (7th Cir.1986), the Court said: 
". . .A thorough review of the record by this 
Court has failed to produce the damning dilatory 
conduct normally associated with the sanction of 
dismissal." (At p.275) 
" . . . The need for the district court to exer-
cise discretion in deciding among alternative sanc-
tions was especially great in this case, given the 
plaintiff's prose status. We have previously stat-
ed: fIt is the recognized duty of the trial court 
to insure that the claims of a prose (litigant) are 
given a fair and meaningful consideration*. . ." 
". . . The accessibility of the courts to those who 
cannot afford counsel is too important a value to 
be sacrificed for the needless exaction of harsh 
penalties for isolated and minor mistakes." (At 
p.277. Emphasis added, cites deleted) 
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". . . This careful consideration is all the more 
important when factors are present, such as the action 
is relatively young, a litigant is proceeding prose, 
or no prior warning has been given that a sanction of 
dismissal will be imposed. The district court's ac-
tions here did not reflect the exercise of discretion, 
but rather the abuse of it. We reverse." (At p.278, 
emphasis added) 
In Zuern v. Jensen, 336 N.W.2d 329 (N.D.S.Ct.1983), the Supreme 
Court of North Dakota had some very firm comments to make relating 
to attorney fees: 
". . . It is well-settled that attorney fees are 
not recoverable in an action unless expressly author-
ized by statute. . . Accordingly, we conclude that 
the trial court did not err in refusing to award at-
torney fees to Jensen." (Cites deleted) 
". . . The foregoing section does not require costs 
to be assessed against a plaintiff whose action has 
been dismissed upon his own motion, nor has Jensen re-
ferred this Court to any other statutory provision 
requiring costs to be so assessed." (At p.330) 
Another very good case where some excellent points are made re-
garding the issue at hand is Webber v. Eye Corp., 721 F.2d 1067 
(7th Cir.1983). Here are some excerpts: 
" . . . The sanction of dismissal is the most se-
vere sanction that a court may apply, and its use 
must be tempered by a careful exercise of judicial 
discretion." (At p.1069. Emphasis added, cites de-
leted) 
". . . Moreover, the case was barely eighteen 
months old when dismissed by the district court. A 
dismissal with prejudice is particularly disfavored 
with relatively young cases, such as the one before 
us." (At p.1070. Emphasis added, cites deleted) 
" . . . Finally, there is no evidence that defen-
dant would have been unduly harmed or prejudiced had 
the court granted plaintiff's request for a continu-
ance. While defendant's witnesses may have been in-
convenienced by postponing the trial, the harm to 
plaintiff in being barred from presenting his case 
is much greater." 
" . . . While not unmindful of the ever increasing 
load of litigation in all courts, both federal and 
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state, we agree that courts have been created for the 
very purpose of trying cases on their merits and that 
dismissals with prejudice and default judgments should 
not be utilized as a handy instrument for lessening the 
case load burden." (At p.1071. Emphasis added) 
Appellant is sure this Court will find Jackson v. Washington 
Monthly Co., 569 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir.1977), to be a very interesting 
and comprehensive Opinion, written for the U.S. Court of Appeals, 
D.C. Circuit, by Judge Spottswood W. Robinson, III, who undoubtedly 
did extensive research on this case because he has included at least 
fifty (50) citations throughout voluminous footnotes. (Fifty cites 
is an estimate—too many to count). Here is what Judge Robinson said 
in his closing remarks: 
" . . . When the client has not personally misbe-
haved and his opponent in the litigation has not been 
harmed, the interests of justice are better served by 
an exercise of discretion in favor of appropriate ac-
tion against the lawyer as the medium for vindication 
of the judicial process and protection of the citizenry 
from future imposition. Public confidence in the le-
gal system is not enhanced when one component punishes 
blameless litigants for the misdoings of another com-
ponent of the system; to laymen unfamiliar with the 
fundamentals of agency law, that can only convey the 
erroneous impression that lawyers protect other law-
yers at the expense of everyone else." (At p.123-124. 
Emphasis added—makes sense to me.) 
In Stevens v. Red Barn Chemicals, Inc., 76 F.R.D. Ill (1977), 
the Court said in this case: 
" . . . From the record before the Court in the in-
stant case, the Court is unable to conclude that dis-
missal with prejudice is warranted. Accordingly, De-
fendant's request for the same should be overruled. 
Likewise, Defendant's request that the dismissal here-
in be upon the condition that Plaintiffs must refile 
this action in this Court or be barred from further 
relief should also be overruled for the reason that 
the Court is unwilling to prevent Plaintiffs from liti-
gating their cause of action in any forum made avail-
able to them by state or federal statutes." (At p.113) 
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Another comprehensive, well written Opinion is found in Gideon v. 
Bo-Mar Homes, Inc., 469 P.2d 272 (S.Ct. of Kan.1970). Under point 6 
of a syllabus, the Court said: 
"..(1) The district court abused its judicial dis-
cretion by failing to apply the appropriate legal and 
equitable principles to the conceded facts and circum-
stances, and (2) the defendants would not be subjected 
to plain 'legal prejudice1 so as to preclude voluntary 
dismissal by the plaintiffs without prejudice upon or-
der of the court and upon such terms and conditions as 
it might deem proper." (At p.274) 
11
. . .no discovery was had upon it and at the time 
the plaintiffs' motion for dismissal without prejudice 
was filed, the case was barely at issue. ." (At p.277) 
11
. . . Unless otherwise specified in the order, a 
dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice. ." 
(At p.276, emphasis added) 
11
. . . Moreover, the authorities are agreed that 
the gain of a tactical advantage of whatever nature is 
not legal prejudice. . ." (At p.278, emphasis added) 
,f
. . .'(i)t has already been decided that the incon-
venience or anticipated prejudice to defendant does not 
warrant denial of plaintiffs' withdrawal.' . ." (At 
p.278, emphasis added) 
The following case is a rare instance where a Petition for a 
writ of mandamus is successful. See Goodman v. Gordon, 447 P.2d 230 
(S.Ct. of Ariz.1968). Here are some closing excerpts from Chief Jus-
tice McFarland writing for the Arizona Supreme Court in banc: 
". . . and a court's failure to consider the plain-
tiff's equities is a 'denial of a full and complete 
exercise of judicial discretion.'. ." (At p.232) 
" . . . While expenses may properly be made a con-
dition of granting a dismissal, omission of such con-
dition is not an arbitrary act." (At p.232, cites 
deleted, emphasis added) 
" . . . In our opinion only the most extraordinary 
circumstances will justify the trial court in refus-
ing to grant a motion by a plaintiff to dismiss with-
out prejudice. . ." (At p.233, emphasis added) 
The next case is Independent Productions Corp v. Loew's Incor-
porated, 283 F.2d 730 (2nd Cir.1960), wherein more than twenty (20) 
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big New York City law firms were involved. Here are two closing 
passages: 
11
. . . The dismissal of an action with prejudice 
or the entry of a judgment by default are drastic 
remedies, and should be applied only in extreme 
circumstances. . . TIn final analysis, a court has 
the responsibility to do justice between man and 
man, and general principles cannot justify denial 
of a party's fair day in court except upon a seri-
ous showing of willful default.1. ." (At p.733, 
cites deleted, emphasis added) 
The last case in this group is Kuzma v. Bessemer & Lake Erie 
Railroad, 259 F.2d 456 (3rd Cir.1958). In a per curiam Opinion, the 
Third Circuit said this: 
". . . The trial judge indicated that he did not 
wish to preclude the plaintiff from having his day 
in court in the Ohio case. But a dismissal with pre-
judice or even a dismissal without qualification un-
der Rule 41(b) operates as an adjudication on the 
merits by the very words of the rule. And an un-
favorable adjudication on the merits in Pennsylvania 
would, of course, be a complete defense on the gr-
ounds of res judicata to the suit pending in Ohio." 
(At p.457) 
It should be noted in the foregoing, that the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated essentially what Appellant 
has endeavored to point out from the outset of this Appeal. That is: 
". . . a dismissal with prejudice or even a dismissal without quali-
fication under Rule 41(b) operates as an adjudication on the merits 
by the very words of the rule." Therefore, such an adverse dismis-
sal means that the Courts will automatically impose res judicata on 
any future action involving the same parties wherein the suit is 
based on the same grounds. 
/ / / / 
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POINT III 
THE STATE "STATUTES" SUBMITTED BY 
THE APPELLEES ARE LARGELY IRRELEVANT 
Turning to Point II of Appellees1 argument, including a rather 
lengthy subtitle which reads: "The Lower Court's Dismissal With Pre-
judice Was Not an Abuse of Discretion in Light of the Statutory Time 
Limit Prohibiting Appellant's Action in the Future." Point II then 
begins: 
"The essence of Appellant SLater's argument appears 
to be that the lower court's dismissal 'with prejudice' 
will bar Slater's access to the courts. Appellant's 
Br. at 31-32. Slater's argument fails to recognize that, 
regardless of whether his action is dismissed with or 
without prejudice, this particular action will be bar-
red from the courts as a result of the statutory time 
limit on district court reviews of informal agency ac-
tions." (Emphasis included, cite deleted) 
Appellant quoted verbatim this particular part of Appellees' 
argument because it represents a specific theory of contention found 
throughout their Brief. When it is stated that ". . . this particu-
lar action will be barred from the courts as a result of the statu-
tory time limit on district court reviews of informal agency actions" 
Appellant can agree with that statement. That is, when referring 
to "this particular action." 
But what about another action next year, or the year after that, 
which is not only similar to this cause of action, but almost identi-
cal? Then what? If the present action is dismissed without preju-
dice, Appellant would be free to turn to the Courts if he could not 
resolve a similar dispute in the Administrative Branch of State gov-
ernment. But if the present action is dismissed with prejudice, 
Appellant would be forever barred from seeking relief in the Courts 
on the same kind of action. It wouldn't have to be the same action 
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to be barred; only the same kind, type, form of action involving the 
same parties. Namely, this Appellant filing a Petition in District 
Court seeking relief based on the same grounds against the same State 
agency or administrators who handle the H.E.A.T. Program. 
Neither this Court nor counsel for the defense needs a lecture 
on the deadly force of res judicata. Even this prose litigant is 
well aware of its power legally, analogous to double jeopardy. "..The 
sum and substance of the whole rule is that a matter once judicially 
decided is finally decided.." (See Black's, Fifth Edition, p.1174 
under "Res"). 
So Appellant knows that when Appellees try to present an argu-
ment involving "statutory time limits", this merely clouds the real 
issue in an effort to make it appear that a dismissal 'with' preju-
dice is really not that bad. As it was phrased in their Brief on 
p.7 ". . Therefore, whether the district court dismissed Slater's 
action with or without prejudice is 'inconsequential'. ." However, 
returning to p.5 of Appellees' Brief, footnote 2 begins with this: 
"A dismissal with prejudice is tantamount to a judg-
ment on the merits and prevents future consideration of 
the claims." (Cites deleted, emphasis added) 
Our State Appellees cannot have it both ways. A dismissal with 
prejudice is either "inconsequential" or a very serious matter "tan-
tamount to a judgment on the merits. ." Appellant firmly reasserts 
that it's the latter: 
". . Dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(b) 
is a harsh and permanent remedy when it precludes 
a presentation of a plaintiff's claims on their 
merits. ." (See Bonneville Tower v. Thompson Mi-
chie Assoc, 728 P.2d at p.1020 (Utah S.Ct.1986) 
". . The sanction of dismissal is the most se-
vere sanction that a court may apply. ." (See 
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Webber v. Eye Corp., 721 F.2d at p.1069 (7th Cir.1983). 
In the Webber case, the 7th Circuit also said, ". . A 
dismissal with prejudice is particularly disfavored 
with relatively young cases, such as the one before 
us." (At p.1070. Emphasis added in foregoing quotes) 
Facts Relating to 
the Origin of This Case 
Before concluding, Appellant believes some additional informa-
tion would be helpful regarding the origin of this case, and particu-
larly since Appellees chose to cover some of the basics in that con-
nection, found on pages 3 and 4 of their Brief, primarily concerning 
the H.E.A.T. Program. 
It is correctly pointed out in Appellees' Brief that ". . Appel-
lant Slater's application for HEAT assistance was approved. .tf Also 
correct in their Brief is the fact that the dispute arose over the 
"amount of assistance" which the local H.E.A.T. supervisor insisted 
must be sharply reduced, because in Appellant's apartment building 
the basic source of heat came from steam radiators. 
Even though Appellant has been living in the same basement apart-
ment, right next to the boiler room since 1981, it became an exercise 
in futility to try and explain to Chris Megalonkis (local H.E.A.T. 
supervisor) that the fuel to the boiler furnace was natural gas— 
which is expensive—and classified under the H.E.A.T. Program as a 
high priority fuel, second only to electricity, which Appellant also 
used periodically in a space heater, in addition to the steam heat. 
Thus, Appellant's source of fuel for heat came under a more ex-
pensive category within the Program, and not to be confused with 
less costly coal, wood or oil. Still, the local H.E.A.T. office took 
exactly the opposite position, refusing to accept the word of a 
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tenant who had lived in the same building for over 11 years! And that 
ill-conceived decision at the local level was erroneously upheld by 
an administrative hearing officer on April 20, 1992, followed by Ap-
pellant's Petition for Judicial Review of an Administrative Order 
filed on June 1, 1992. 
There are numerous statutes, codes and a multitude of regulations 
that govern the H.E.A.T. Program, some of which are listed in Appel-
leess1 Brief under "Table of Authorities" and cited in later segments. 
Appellant has been certain for some time that he was well within his 
rights and fully supported by regulatory authority, particularly by 
the most important Administrative Codes, two of which were not discus-
sed in Appellees' Brief, namely: R513-602-218. Vulnerability, ii. "House-
holds who are currently paying energy costs indirectly through rent." 
And, R513-606-608. "Determination of the Primary Fuel Type." 
As just stated, Appellant was confident that he would prevail if 
he pressed his Petition forward, because, not only were the facts 
clearly in Appellant's favor, but also the governing regulations as 
well. On the other hand, there were also sound reasons why Appellant 
chose to dismiss his cause of action when that Motion was filed. Ap-
pellant's health had improved considerably following open heart sur-
gery, along with a much better income compared with the recent past. 
So why burden the Court or the Respondents now if it wasn't mandatory 
to do so? Furthermore, if assistance was needed from the H.E.A.T. Pro-
gram later on, perhaps the local office would have reconsidered its 
earlier position. If not, the case could then be re-opened and pressed 
to a favorable result. 
All of the foregoing were sound reasons for moving for a dis-
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missal when that Motion was filed. Likewise, it was also sound reason-
ing to appeal the lower Court Order dismissing Appellant's action with 
prejudice, because, if that Order were allowed to stand, Appellant's 
acquiescence would suggest his consent. More accurately, any form 
of passive compliance would be a defeat by default. Never, for one 
moment, has Appellant ever seriously considered inaction or submission 
to such an arbitrary and unreasonable decision as the irrational dis-
missal in this case issued by the Court below. 
Appellant's appeal to this Court is not based on the original 
dispute between himself and the Appellees. No, Appellant filed a Mo-
tion in good faith in the Court below to dismiss that action a year 
ago this month. However, the lower Court adversely decreed that Ap-
pellant should be punished for moving for a dismissal of his action. 
In fact, punished severely by a Court Order to dismiss the case with 
prejudice, thereby denying Appellant any opportunity to ever refile 
a similar action against the same Defendants in the future—if such 
action were based on the same grounds. This was a very biased, un-
fair and unwarranted lower Court decision and the principle reason 
for this Appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
In the final analysis, why should the State Appellees pursue 
such an unjust cause? What is their purpose? Who are they defending? 
Or protecting? What possible damage would the State suffer if Appel-
lant were to prevail in this Appeal? 
First of all, Appellant was unsuccessful in his effort to over-
turn an adverse decision made at the local level of State government. 
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Appellant failed again when the matter was appealed to a hearing pro-
cess at a higher Administrative level. Appellant then petitioned for 
relief from a District Court, but later decided to voluntarily dis-
miss his Petition. Thus, for a third time the State Appellees pre-
vailed, all of which was accomplished with scarcely no legal expendi-
ture, either in time or effort other than filing a very short, simple 
Answer consisting of less than a full page of written material (four 
7-word denials and a line and one-half alleging Appellant had failed 
to state a claim. See Appellant's Addendum to his opening Brief at 
Section IV, Respondents1 "Answer to Petition"). 
Now, with no defeats, while enjoying nothing but success after 
3 very brief legal encounters with Appellant, it appears the State 
Appellees won't be satisfied until Appellant's legitimate cause of 
action and well founded Appeal to this Court are, not only defeated, 
but destroyed. 
Again, what could possibly be the State's purpose in pursuing 
such an unjust cause? The District Court not only erred, but commit-
ted a flagrant abuse of judicial discretion in this matter. Appel-
lant has submitted a substantial, if not overwhelming number of solid 
case citations in support of his position in this Appeal. 
There is absolutely no"legal, ethical or moral reason why the 
prejudicial dismissal issued by the Court below should be upheld. 
What could possibly be advantages in behalf of the State to protect 
the District Court in this matter? Surely, it cannot be in defense 
of the rights of this State's citizens, because the lower Court de-
cision in question represents a denial of basic rights which should 
be guaranteed under both our State and Federal Constitutions, par-
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ticularly the right of Due Process, Equal Protection, and the right 
to Petition for a Redress of Grievances. 
Any judicial decision that clearly denies such basic rights, 
must be reversed; not only in behalf of Appellant's cause, but in 
the interst of justice—justice for this community, this State, and 
to help restore a spark of renewed faith in our overloaded, under-
funded judicial system. 
Appellant is standing firm against an abusive judicial action 
that, if permitted to go unchallenged, would eventually lead to the 
judiciary running roughshod over the civil rights of everyone—rights 
that must be diligently protected—if not by the Courts, then by each 
and every citizen who believes in our form of government. 
Ironically, as a matter of legal principle, the present issue 
before this Court is of far greater importance in relation to funda-
mental rights, when compared to the original controversey between 
Appellant and these governmental Appellees. In order to preserve and 
protect those basic rights, Appellant must prevail in this Appeal. 
The Order issued by the Court below is discriminatory, a misuse 
of power that is contrary to both principle and precedent. It must 
be reversed. 
DATED this jPy^^day of May, 1994. 
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